In this paper we compare the semantical and syntactical definitions of extensions for open default theories. We prove that, over monadic languages, these definitions are equivalent and do not depend on the cardinality of the underlying infinite world. We also show that, under the domain closure assumption, one free variable open default theories are decidable.
Introduction
Non-monotonic logics are intended to simulate the process of human reasoning by providing a formalism for deriving consistent conclusions from an incomplete description of the world.
Reiter's default logic [13] is one of the widely used non-monotonic formalisms and may be the only non-monotonic formalism that has a clearly useful contribution to the wider field of computer science through logic programming and database theory. This logic deals with rules of inference called defaults which are expressions of the form
where (x), 1 (x), . . . , m (x), m 1, and (x) are formulas of first-order logic whose free variables are among x = x 1 , . . . , x n . A default is closed if none of , 1 , . . . , m , and contains a free variable.
Otherwise it is open. Roughly speaking, the intuitive meaning of a default is as follows. For every n-tuple of objects t = t 1 , . . . , t n , if (t) is believed, and the i (t)s are consistent with one's beliefs, then one is permitted to deduce (t) and add it to the "belief set." Thus, an open default can be thought of as a kind of "default scheme," where free variables x can be replaced by any of the theory's objects. Various examples of deduction by defaults can be found in [13] . Whereas closed defaults have been quite thoroughly investigated, very little is known about open ones. However, interesting cases of default reasoning usually deal with open defaults, because the intended use of defaults is to determine whether an object possesses a given property, rather than accepting or rejecting a "fixed statement.'' It was pointed out in [8] that when applying open defaults one must specify all the objects of the underlying theory. Also, it was argued in [4] that one must distinguish between objects defined explicitly (closed terms) and objects introduced implicitly (by existential formulas, say).
In this paper we use the semantical definition of extensions for open default theories proposed in [8, 4] , where, in contrast to the syntactical definitions in [12, 13] , the default-free variables are treated as object variables, rather than meta-variables for the closed terms of the theory. The reason for choosing a semantical definition of extensions is that, on the one hand, it provides a complete description of the theory objects, while distinguishing between explicitly and implicitly defined ones, on the other.
Since the semantical treatment of open default theories allows one to describe all the elements of the domain under consideration, it has no syntactical counterpart within the ordinary first-order default logic, unless the domain is explicitly defined by the domain closure assumption, i.e., the axiom
where t 1 , . . . , t m are closed terms. Under the domain closure assumption, extensions can be described syntactically by extending the underlying language of default theory with an infinite set of new constant symbols and replacing each open default with the set of all its closed instances. It was shown in [7] that extensions for open default theories depend on the domain cardinality (cf. [5] ) and that over countable 1 or finite domains, extensions for open default theories can be described syntactically in first-order logic extended with an infinitary Carnap rule of inference
denoted by C. Here and hereafter T L denotes the set of all closed terms of a language L. 2 In this paper we show that, when the underlying language of default theory is monadic, the semantical definition and the above syntactical description of extensions for open default theories are equivalent and do not depend on the cardinality of the underlying infinite domain. That is, extensions for open default theories over monadic languages can be (equivalently) described syntactically in first-order logic extended with the Carnap rule of inference. Like in the case of explicitly defined finite domains, the syntactical definition treats an open default as the set of all its closed instances over the underlying language of default theory, extended with an infinite set of new constant symbols. We prove then, that in this syntactical definition, it is sufficient to extend the underlying language with a countable set of new constant symbols. As a corollary we obtain that the original semantical definition of extension for open default theories over monadic languages can always be restricted to a countable base.
It should be pointed out that, even though monadic languages are rather restrictive, many (if not most) examples and case studies of open default deal with monadic languages.
In addition, we show that, under the domain closure assumption (2), for uniterm default theories introduced in [1], we may restrict ourselves to a computable finite base. Therefore, uniterm default theories are decidable.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the notation and some basic results used throughout this paper, and in Section 3 we show that extensions for default theories over monadic languages do not depend on the cardinality of the underlying infinite domain. In Section 4 we show that under the domain closure assumption, extensions for uniterm default theories do not depend on the cardinality of the underlying domain and, therefore, we may restrict ourselves to an explicitly defined finite domain. Finally, Section 5 contains the proofs of some of the statements from Sections 2-4.
Background
In this section we briefly recall the definitions of default theories and the Herbrand semantics of first-order logic. In what follows we assume that language L of the underlying first-order logic is countable.
Default theories
Reiter's default logic [13] deals with rules of inference called defaults which are expressions of the form (1). 1 In this paper, "countable" means infinite countable. 2 Obviously, the domain closure assumption (2) implies C (3) , and, if T L is finite, then the converse implication also holds.
A default theory is a pair (D, A), where D is a set of defaults and A is a set of first-order sentences (axioms). A default theory is closed, if all its defaults are closed. However, in general, default theories are referred to as open. 3 
Extensions for closed default theories
Here, we present the syntactical and semantical definitions of extensions for closed default theories. Recall that closed defaults are expressions of the form
where , 1 , . . . , m , m 1, and are closed formulas.
Definition 1 (Reiter [13, Definition 1] ). Let (D, A) be a closed default theory. For any set of sentences S let (D,A) (S) be the smallest set of sentences B (beliefs) that satisfies the following three properties.
Next, we present a semantical definition of extension for closed default theories. Here and hereafter, for any class of interpretations W, by Th L (W ) we mean the set of all closed formulas over L satisfied by all elements of W. Definition 2 (Guerreiro and Casanova [3] ). Let (D, A) be a closed default theory over L. For any class of interpretations W, let (D,A) (W ) be the largest class V of models of A that satisfies the following condition.
If
Theorem 1 states that the definition of extensions as the theories of the fixed points of the operator is equivalent to Reiter's original definition (Definition 1). [3] , see also [10, Theorem 3.45, p. 65] ). A set of sentences E is an extension for a closed default theory (D, A) if and only if E = Th L (W ) for some fixed point W of (D,A) .
Theorem 1 (Guerreiro and Casanova

Herbrand semantics of first-order logic
In this section we define Herbrand semantics of first-order logic that is the basis of the semantical approach to open default theories.
Let b be a set that contains no symbols of the underlying language L. We denote by L b the language obtained from L by augmenting its set of constants with all elements of b. 4 The set of all closed terms of the language L b is called the Herbrand universe of L b . A Herbrand b-interpretation is a set of ground (closed) atomic formulas of L b . Note that closed formulas over L b are of the form (t 1 , . . . , t n ), where t 1 , . . . , t n are closed terms of language L b and (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a formula over L whose free variables are among x 1 , . . . , x n . The set b is called the base of Herbrand b-interpretation.
Let w be a Herbrand b-interpretation and let be a closed formula over L b . We say that w satisfies , denoted w , if the following holds. For a Herbrand b-interpretation w we define the L-theory (L b -theory) of w, denoted Th L (w) (Th L b (w)), as the set of all closed formulas of L (L b ) satisfied by w. For a set of Herbrand b-interpretations W we define the L-theory (L b -theory) of W, denoted Th L (W ) (Th L b (W )), as the set of all closed formulas of L (L b ) satisfied by all elements of W. That is, Th L 
). Finally, let X be a set of closed formulas over L b . We say that w is a Herbrand b-model of X, denoted by w X, if X ⊆ Th L b (w). Remark 1. It is well-known that for an infinite set of new constant symbols b, Herbrand b-interpretations are complete and sound for first-order logic. That is, for a set of formulas X over L and a formula over L, X ٛ if and only if is satisfied by all Herbrand b-interpretations which satisfy X. In particular, Herbrand b-interpretations with an infinite base naturally arise in the Henkin proof of the completeness theorem [11, Lemma 2.16, p. 89].
Extensions for open default theories
In this section, departing from Definition 2 and following [8, 4] we present a definition of extensions for open default theories. It is known from [4] (see also Remark 2 below) that for closed default theories this definition is equivalent to the original Reiter's definition (Definition 1).
We start with the intuition underlying the definition. There are two types of objects in the domain of a default theory. One type consists of the fixed built-in objects which belong to T L and must be present in any Herbrand interpretation, and the other type consist of implicitly defined unknown objects which may vary from one Herbrand interpretation to other, e.g., objects introduced by existentially quantified formulas. These objects generate other unknown objects by means of the function symbols of L. Thus, it seems natural to assume that the theory domain is a Herbrand universe of the original language augmented with a set of new (unknown) objects, cf. [9, Chapter 1, Section 3].
The following definition of extensions for open default theories is a relativization of Definition 2 to Herbrand b-interpretations with an infinite set of new constant symbols b. The reason for passing to a semantical definition is that, in general, it is impossible to describe a Herbrand universe by means of the standard proof theory. The only exception is the cases when the theory domain is explicitly finite (see [6] ), i.e., contains axiom (2) . 
We will also refer to the set b as the base of E.
Remark 2.
It follows from the Löwnheim-Skolem theorem that, for a closed default theory (D, A) and an infinite base b, a set of sentences is a b-extension for (D, A) if and only if it is an "ordinary" Reiter's extension for (D, A).
From now on, unless we state otherwise, we deal with infinite bases, because the cardinality of a finite base b can be extracted from the b-extension, which is undesirable in the general case. 
Syntactical description of extensions for open default theories
This section contains a syntactical definition of extensions for open default theories. The basic idea of the syntactical definition is, roughly speaking, as follows. Following [12] , we treat an open default as the set of all its closed instances over language L b that is the original language L extended with the base b of H b .
Whereas over explicitly defined finite domains, "completeness" of the set of all closed instances of a set of defaults follows from the domain closure assumption (2) , completeness in the case of infinite domains is a more delicate issue. The infinite domain counterpart of the domain closure assumption is the Carnap rule of inference C (3). Definition 4 below is a relativization of Definition 1 to first-order logic extended with C. We shall need one more bit of notation.
For a set of formulas X we denote by Th C (X) the set of all formulas derivable from X in first-order logic extended with C. We say that a set of formulas X is C-consistent if Th C (X) is consistent in the usual first-order sense.
Definition 4 (Kaminski et al. [7, Definition 6.5] ). Let (D, A) be a closed default theory. For any set of sentences S let C (D,A) (S) be the smallest set of sentences B (beliefs) that satisfies the following three properties.
To define C-extensions for open default theories we need the formal definition of a closed instance of an open default.
. . , t n is a tuple of closed terms of the underlying language. For a set of defaults D we denote byD L the set of all closed instances (over L) of all defaults of D.
Theorem 2 shows that, in contrast with Remark 3, restrictions of C-extensions for (D L b , A) to L do not depend on the cardinality of the (infinite) base b. This theorem and its corollary are our new results, but they naturally belong to this section of the background. Theorem 2 is used for the proofs of the results stated in Section 3.
Theorem 2 (Cf. Remark 3). Let (D, A) be an open default theory and let b and b be infinite sets of new constant symbols. Then for any C-extension
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Section 5.1.
Corollary 1. Let (D, A) be a closed default theory and let b be an infinite set of new constant symbols. Then a set of L
Proof. By Theorem 2, we may assume that b is countable. Then, by [7, Theorem 6.6] (see also Theorem 4 
, and the corollary follows from Remark 2.
Extensions over countable bases
This section deals with extensions over a countable base b. We start with the completeness theorem for first-order logic with the Carnap rule over countable languages. We shall use the following terminology.
When the language L b is fixed or understood from the context, Herbrand b-interpretations (models) will be referred to as term interpretations (models).
Obviously, term interpretations are sound for the Carnap rule. Theorem 3 shows that if the underlying language is countable, then term interpretations are also complete.
Theorem 3 (Kaminski et al. [7, Theorem 6.3] ). Let b be a finite or countable set of new constant symbols. Then each C-consistent set of formulas over L b has a term model. Remark 4. It is well-known that there are C-consistent sets of formulas over an uncountable language which do not have a term model, e.g., see [7, Example 6.7] . In particular, the language in this example is L b , where b is an uncountable set of new constant symbols. 6 Now, using Theorem 3, we can show that, for countable bases, semantical and syntactical definitions of extensions are equivalent. 
Remark 5. Note that the above corollary does not hold in the general case, see [7, Example 6.9 ]. Thus, as it was pointed out in [7] , in order to define syntactically extensions over uncountable domains, we have, in addition to the Carnap rule, to use infinitary languages which allow to express set-theoretic rules of inference. It seems that infinitary logic is a too high price for a syntactical equivalent of the domain closure assumption.
Default theories over monadic languages
This section deals with the main subject of our paper-open default theories over monadic languages. We show that, for monadic languages, the semantical and the syntactical definitions of extensions are equivalent and do not depend on the cardinality of the (infinite) base b.
We start with the completeness theorem for first-order logic with the Carnap rule over monadic languages. Note that in Theorem 5, L b has countably many predicate symbols, whereas the set of its constant symbols may be uncountable. The example shows that Theorem 5 does not extend onto the languages whose set of predicate symbols is uncountable.
Example (Cf. [7, Example 6.7] ). Let I and J be an uncountable and a countable sets of indices, respectively, and let the underlying language consist of unary predicates {P i } i∈I and constant symbols {a j } j ∈J .
Let the set of proper axioms X consist of formulas
Like in the proof of [7, Proposition 6.8] one can show that X is C-consistent. However, X does not have a term model, because each its term model induces an injection from an uncountable I into a countable J.
For what follows we need to restate Theorem 5 in an equivalent form given by Theorem 6. 
Finally, Theorem 8, that states that for monadic languages b-extensions do not depend on the cardinality of an infinite base b, is an immediate consequence of Theorems 2 and 7.
Theorem 8. Let L be a monadic language, (D, A) be an open default theory over L, and let b and b be infinite sets of new constant symbols. Then E is a b-extension for (D, A) if and only if it is a b -extension for (D, A).
In particular, it follows from Theorem 8 that when dealing with open default theories over monadic languages we may restrict ourselves to a countable base b, which is not true in the general case (see Remark 3).
Uniterm default theories
This section deals with uniterm default theories introduced in [1] (see also Definition 6) . We show that under the domain closure assumption (2), when dealing with uniterm default theories, we may restrict ourselves to finite bases.
In the general case, it is known from [6] that under the domain closure assumption b-extensions for an open default theory (D, A) coincide with the restrictions of extensions of (D L b , A) to L, see Theorem 9. 
The main result of this section is that for a uniterm default theory (D, A) the restrictions of extensions for (D L b , A)
to L do not depend on the cardinality of base b (Theorem 10). Thus, under the domain closure assumption, b-extensions for uniterm default theories do not depend on the cardinality of b either.
Theorem 10. Let (D, A) be a uniterm default theory. There exists a finite set of new constant symbols b such that for any infinite set of new constant symbols b the following holds. There is an extension E for (D L b , A) if and only if there is an extension
The proof of Theorem 10 is presented in Section 5.3. Now it follows from Theorems 9 and 10 that, under the domain closure assumption, when dealing with uniterm default theories we may restrict ourselves to finite bases. Theorem 11. Let (D, A) be a uniterm default theory, such that for some constants a 1 , . . . , a m , A ٛ ∀x m i=1 x = a i . 8 
There exists a finite set of new constant symbols b such that for each infinite set of new constant symbols b the following holds. A set of formulas is a b-extension for (D, A) if and only if it is a b -extension for (D, A).
An immediate proof of Theorem 10 follows in Section 5.3 that, under the domain closure assumption, extensions for uniterm default theories are computable.
Proofs
Here, we present the proofs of Theorem 2 (Section 5.1), Theorem 5 (Section 5.2), and Theorem 10 (Section 5.3).
Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we prove that the intersections of C-extensions for (D L b , A) with Fm L do not depend on the cardinality of the infinite base b. Namely, we show that we may restrict ourself to a countable set b of new constant symbols.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of [5, Theorem 7] . In the next section we define the so-called C,R-proof systems and in Section 5.1.2 we prove the major auxiliary lemmas and the theorem itself.
C,R-proof systems
In this section we introduce the notion of the C,R-proof system. First-order logic extended with C is defined as the C,∅-proof system. 2 , . . . , , . . . of closed formulas over L b such that for every , at least one of the following conditions holds.
• is an axiom of L b . • ∈ X. • There exists 1 , 2 < , such that 1 is of the form 2 ⊃ ( is obtained by modus ponens). • There exists < , such that / ∈ R ( is obtained by the R-rule).
• is of the form ∀x (x) and for each term t ∈ T L b , there exists t < , such that t is (t) ( is obtained by C). We say that a formula is C,R-derivable from X, denoted X ٛ C,R , if there exists a C,R-derivation from X that contains .
We denote by Th C,R (X) the set of all closed formulas C,R-derivable from X, i.e., Th C,R (X) = { : X ٛ C,R }, and we write Th C (X) for Th C,∅ (X). That is, Th C (X) is the set of formulas derivable from X in first-order logic extended with C. Remark 7. The reason for dealing with derivations from sets of closed formulas only is that, because of C, we may restrict ourselves to the closed instances of the first-order axioms. In particular, Generalization (x)/∀x (x) is redundant in C,R-derivations.
and let X and X be sets of formulas over Fm L b and Fm L b , respectively. We say that X is a C,R-conservative extension of X if Th C, Proof. For the proof we fix a C,R-derivation from X containing all elements of Th C,R (X), that will be referred to as the canonical derivation. Also, we shall use the following notation. For a formula over L b we denote by b the set of all elements of b which appear in , 10 and for a set of formulas S over L b we denote by b S the set of all elements of b which appear in the formulas of S. That is, b S = ∈S b . Similarly, for a term t over L b we denote by b t the set of all elements of b which appear in t. Now, for each formula ∈ Fm L b we define a subset [ ] of b as described below. The definition depends on the cases of X ٛ C,R and X ٛ C,R .
Assume X ٛ C,R .
• If is an axiom, an element of X, or is derived (in the canonical derivation) by C, then [ ] = b .
• If is derived (in the canonical derivation) by modus ponens from and ⊃ , or is derived from by R-rule
Next we construct a sequence b 0 , b 1 , . . . of subsets of b by the following induction
Finally, we let b be ∞ i=0 b i . It immediately follows from the definition that [ ] is finite. Therefore, each b i is countable and b is countable as well.
We contend that X is a C,R-conservative extension of X ∩ Fm L b . That is, for any closed formula over L b ,
For the "only if" part, assume that X ∩Fm L b ٛ C,R . We shall show by induction on the length of the C,R -derivation of from X ∩ Fm L b that X ٛ C,R .
The induction basis, i.e., the case in which is an axiom or belongs to X ∩ Fm L b is straightforward. For the induction step, the cases in which is obtained by modus ponens or an R-rule immediately follow from the induction hypothesis.
Assume that is of the form ∀x (x) and is obtained from
Also, since for each t ∈ T L b , a C,R -derivation of (t) appears in the derivation of , by the induction hypothesis,
Now, assume to the contrary that X ٛ C,R ∀x (x). Since ∀x (x) ∈ Fm L b , for some j = 0, 1, . . ., ∀x (x) ∈ Fm L b j , and, by the definition of b j +1 , for some t ∈ b j +1 (⊆ b ), X ٛ C,R (t), in contradiction with (4). For the "if" part of the lemma, let X ٛ C,R . We shall prove by induction on the length of that proof that X ∩
Like in the proof of the "only if" part of the lemma, the induction basis is immediate. The cases of modus ponens and R-rules are trivial 12 and we shall consider the case of C only.
Moreover, (t) appears in the canonical derivation prior to . Thus, the induction hypothesis, X ∩ Fm L b ٛ C,R (t) for each t ∈ T L b , and, by C, X ∩ Fm L b ٛ C,R .
Countable bases and the proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on Lemmas 2 and 3. 
The proof of the lemma immediately follows from the definitions and is omitted. 
Proof. Let Since R = R| L b and E = E ∩ Fm L b , we have R = R . Therefore,
which completes the proof of the lemma. Now Theorem 2 immediately follows from Lemma 3. Indeed, we may assume that b is countable and, since the elements of b do not belong to L, renaming them, if necessary, we may assume that b is the set of constants from Lemma 3. Therefore, E ∩ Fm L = E ∩ Fm L .
Proof of Theorem 5
In this section we prove that each C-consistent set of formulas over L b has a term model. The proof is similar to the Henkin proof of the classical completeness theorem. It is based on the following C-counterparts of the well-known classical results. C-deduction theorem) . Let X be a set of closed formulas and let and be closed formulas such that X, ٛ C . Then X ٛ C ⊃ .
Lemma 4 (The
Lemma 5. Let X be a C-consistent theory and let be a closed formula. If X ٛ C , then X ∪ {¬ } is C-consistent. Lemma 6. Let X be a C-consistent theory and let (x) be a formula such that X ٛ C ∃x (x). Then for some term t,
The proofs of the lemmas are a straightforward extension of the proof of the corresponding classical results and are omitted. Now we are almost ready for the proof of Theorem 5. We just need the following definition and lemma. Proof of Theorem 5. Let X be a C-consistent set of formulas over L b . We shall prove that X has a term model. Let ∃x 0 (x), ∃x 1 (x), . . . , ∃x i (x), . . . be a sequence of all basic formulas over L. 13 We shall construct a sequence of sets of closed formulas X i by induction as follows.
By Lemmas 5 and 6, in both cases X i+1 is C-consistent. Let X = ∞ i=0 X i . Then X is consistent (in the usual first-order sense), because all X i are consistent. In addition, it immediately follows from the definition of X that it is complete with respect to the set of all basic formulas over L. 14 Let w be a maximal (with respect to inclusion) set of closed atomic formulas over L b such that X ∪ w is consistent (in the usual first-order sense).
In particular, w is a Herbrand b-interpretation. Since X ⊆ X , the proof of the theorem will be completed if we show that for each closed formula ∈ Fm L b , w if and only if X ∪ w ٛ . In fact, by Lemma 7, it suffices to show that the equivalence holds for closed atomic and basic formulas, because the case of their propositional combinations follows from the maximality of w and the "basic" completeness of X .
The case in which is a closed atomic formula follows from the definition of satisfiability by a Herbrand binterpretation.
Let be of the form ∃x(L 1 (x) ∧ L 2 (x) ∧ · · · ∧ L n (x)) for some literals L 1 (x), L 2 (x), . . . , L n (x). Assume that w . That is, for some c ∈ T L b , w L 1 (c) ∧ L 2 (c) ∧ · · · ∧ L n (c). Thus, by maximality of w, wٛL 1 (c) ∧ L 2 (c) ∧ · · · ∧ L n (c), implying w ٛ ∃x(L 1 (x) ∧ L 2 (x) ∧ · · · ∧ L n (x)).
Conversely, assume X ∪ w ٛ . Since X ∪ w is consistent, X ٛ ¬∃x(L 1 (x) ∧ L 2 (x) ∧ · · · ∧ L n (x)). Thus, by the definition of X , for some c ∈ T L b , L 1 (c) ∧ L 2 (c) ∧ · · · ∧ L n (c) ∈ X . By the definition of w, w L 1 (c) ∧ L 2 (c) ∧ · · · ∧ L n (c), and w follows.
Proof of Theorem 10
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 10 stating that for a uniterm default theory (D, A) there exists a finite set of new constant symbols b such that for any infinite set of new constant symbols b the following holds. There is an extension E for (
The proof of the "if" part of Theorem is presented in Section 5.3.1 and the proof of its "only if" part is presented in Section 5.3.2.
Proof of the "if" part of Theorem 10
The proof of the "if" part of Theorem 10 immediately follows from Lemma 8. 13 Recall that L is countable. 14 That is, for each basic formula over L, either X ٛ or X ٛ ¬ .
Lemma 8. Let (D, A) be a uniterm default theory, b be a set of new constant symbols, and let b be a non-empty subset of b. Then for any extension
The proof of Lemma 8 is based on the following proposition that will also be used in the proof of Lemma 9 in the next section.
Proposition 1 (Cf. Ben-Eliyahu-Zohary et al. [1, Proposition 4]). Let (D, A) be a uniterm default theory and let b be a set of new constant symbols. Then E is an extension for (D L b , A) if and only if for each new constant symbol
Proposition 1 immediately follows from [1, Proposition 4] , if we treat the elements of Fm L as propositional constants. We leave the details to the reader. Obviously, E ⊆ E ∩ Fm L b . Therefore, for the proof of Lemma 8 it suffices to show that E ∩ Fm L b ⊆ E . Let ∈ E ∩ Fm L b . That is, , 1 (c 1 ), 2 (c 2 ), . . . , n (c n ) ٛ , where ⊂ c∈b E c and { 1 (c 1 ), 2 (c 2 ), . . . , n (c n )} ⊂ c∈b\b E c . 16 Since the i (x)s are formulas over L and the c i s do not appear in the elements of or in , replacing each c i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, in the derivation of from ∪ { 1 (c 1 ), 2 (c 2 ), . . . , n (c n )} with c , we obtain , 1 (c ), 2 (c ), . . . , n (c ) ٛ .
It follows from the definition of the E c i s that for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, i (c ) ∈ E c , which together with ⊂ c∈b E c imply ∈ E . Thus, E ∩ Fm L b ⊆ E .
Proof of the "only if" part of Theorem 10
We start with the definition of the similarity relation between constant symbols of b. Let E = Th( c∈b E c ). Then, by Proposition 1, E is an extension for (D L b , A), and it remains to show that E ∩ Fm L b = E . The inclusion E ⊆ E ∩ Fm L b is obvious.
The proof of E ∩ Fm L b ⊆ E is similar to that of the corresponding inclusion in the proof of Lemma 8.
Let ∈ E ∩ Fm L b . That is, , 1 (c 1 ), 2 (c 2 ), . . . , n (c n ) ٛ , where ⊂ c∈b E c and { 1 (c 1 ), 2 (c 2 ), . . . , n (c n )} ⊂ c∈b\b E c . 15 Loosely speaking, Proposition 1 states that each extension for (D L b , A) "splits" into extensions for (D L {c} , A) , where c ∈ b. 16 Note that constant symbols c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n may not be pairwise different.
Since the i (x)s are formulas over L and the c i s do not appear in the elements of or in , replacing each c i in the derivation of from ∪ {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n } with (c i ), we obtain , 1 ( (c 1 )), 2 ( (c 2 )), . . . , n ( (c n )) ٛ .
It follows from the definition of that for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, i ( (c i )) ∈ E (c i ) , which together with ⊂ c∈b E c imply ∈ E .
Proof of the "only if" part of Theorem 10. By the definition of a uniterm default theory (Definition 6), L is finite. Thus, by Lemma 7, the number of non-equivalent uniterm formulas over L is finite, say, of cardinality k, implying that there are at most 2 k non-E-similar constants.
Since the intersections of extensions for (D L b , A) with Fm L depend only on the cardinality of b , the "only if" part of Theorem 10 follows from Lemma 9 with b of cardinality 2 k or greater.
